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ABSTRACT
A widely held position observed through the lens of transaction cost theory (TCT) has been the
role of information technology in decreasing transaction costs between buyers and suppliers and in
creating more market based governance structures. However, observations have not supported this
contention. In particular, buyer-supplier dyads often engage in cooperative behavior that could offset
opportunistic tendencies espoused by TCT. The role of IT in this structure is unclear. This paper
examines the relationship between perceived transaction costs and the concept of relationalism within
buyer-supplier dyads. The role of IT in mediating this relationship is also examined. Survey data from
203 buyers in the OEM electronics industry is used to test proposed hypotheses. All major
constructs, transaction costs, relationalism, and IT use are operationalized using validated multidimensional scales. The results suggest a positive role of IT in partially offsetting the negative
relationship between transaction costs and relationalism. The results suggest that the decision to use
IT within the dyad can encourage a commitment to establishing relational behavior.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Transaction cost theory (TCT) asserts that any transactional exchange between two parties (e.g.,
buyers and suppliers) is characterized by opportunism, where one party can take advantage of the
other. The level of opportunism depends on the nature of the exchange environment and gives rise
to costs in establishing and managing the relationship called transaction costs. The theory proposes
that markets and hierarchies are two extreme forms of governance mechanisms that can manage
the exchange relationship, and firms would do well to “match” the appropriate mechanism with the
exchange context. For instance, spot markets are appropriate when the transaction costs are low,
perhaps due to simplicity of the products and low investment in customizing the exchange. Similarly,
hierarchies (vertical integration) are appropriate when transaction costs are high due to complex
products and relationship specific investments. In the latter case, ownership or creating an employeeemployer relationship mitigates opportunism. While these unilateral governance mechanisms are
useful in theory, in practice we observe many bilateral alliances, partnerships, and cooperative
arrangements in contemporary firms. Further, with the pervasiveness of networking infrastructures,
information technology (IT) seems to be playing an important role in interfirm relationships [Benjamin
and Wigand 1995].
On the academic front, the role of IT has been mainly observed through a TCT lens. The
arguments made from this vantage point promote the idea that IT reduces the transaction costs
resulting from potential opportunistic behavior and thereby making market-based as opposed to
hierarchical buyer-supplier governance structures more attractive [Malone et al. 1987]. However,
empirical evidence of this is sparse [Hess and Kemerer 1994]. Both buyers and suppliers in various
industries are creating structures that have neither the characteristics of pure markets, nor those of
pure hierarchies. In fact, we observe that many companies limit their number of suppliers in order
to jointly coordinate value chains and create relationships that transcend specific transactional
exchanges. This concept, referred to here as relationalism reflects cooperative behavior with longterm implications. The role of IT in reducing transaction costs seems relatively clear with respect to
pure modes of governance [Malone et al. 1987]; its role in the broader context of relational structures
needs is not well understood. Some researchers have argued that relationalism is a form of
governance that lies between markets and hierarchies [Pilling et al. 1994]. This allows its
interpretation through a transaction cost framework [Dyer 1997]. Others have criticized transaction
cost theory for being restrictive due to its inability to accommodate social constructs such as
cooperation and relationalism [Ghoshal and Moran 1996]. However, here again there is no clear
direction for the effect of IT [Bensaou 1997].
The primary objective of this study is to examine the effect of IT on relationalism in light of
transaction cost economics. Specifically, the study examines
•
•

the association between transaction costs and relationalism
the mediating role of IT on this association

The results will provide insight into the decision to incorporate IT into the dyad as a mechanism for
reducing transaction costs and increasing relationalism. This inquiry captures an important
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manifestation of observable governance structures by further developing a construct of relationalism
within the context of the widely understood transactional framework. Further it operationalizes and
explores the mediating role of IT within the relational context.1
The next four sections develop the concepts of transaction costs, relationalism, their association,
and the role of IT. Based on this, hypotheses are developed. This is followed by a description of a
large-scale study of purchasing companies in the electronics industry. The paper concludes with a
discussion of the results and their implications.
II. TRANSACTION COST THEORY
Transaction cost theory (TCT) has been used extensively in interpreting buyer-supplier
exchanges [Williamson 1975]. Due to their finite cognitive abilities (bounded rationality), neither the
buyer nor the supplier has a complete understanding of the other party and the information upon
which they base their decisions. This leads to the possibility for opportunistic behavior on the part of
each party as they attempt to maximize their utility through the exchange. The presence of unilateral
relationship-specific investments (e.g., technology, people, facilities) that can only be used in the
context of the dyad increases the likelihood of opportunism. This is because the party without the
investment might extract concessions from the other due to the limited value of the other party’s
investment in alternate use.2 Uncertainty in the transaction exchange or complexity of the product
in the transaction can serve to increase the potential for opportunistic behavior and parties might incur
higher transaction costs. These costs include the costs of developing and maintaining an exchange
relationship, monitoring exchange behavior, and guarding against opportunism.
A solution proposed by TCT is to create a governance structure between buyers and suppliers
that matches the nature of the exchange environment. In other words, if transaction costs are high
due to opportunism stemming from relationship-specific investments, then the proposed governance
structure is a hierarchy, where one party finds it easier to “control” (and monitor) the other, create
rewards for desirable behavior, and prevent the ability to profit from specific investments outside the
context of the relationship. This is very much like a firm (vertical integration) structure that reduces
the chance for opportunism [Heide and John 1988]. Alternatively, under conditions of low transaction
costs, it is possible to structure a market-based contract between parties. A market-based governance structure increases coordination costs, but buyers could benefit from better economies of scale
and scope of suppliers and consequently better production costs.
Therefore, the existence of transaction costs creates the opportunity for partners in an exchange
to reduce these costs by changing their governance structures. In a buyer-supplier dyad, the buyer
could see these costs in the effort in developing, monitoring, addressing problems, and gauging
opportunism in the relationship. These costs could vary depending on the characteristics of the
exchange environment. Rational buyers would assess these transaction costs and choose governance structures that can appropriately handle them.

1
In a recent meta-analysis of TCT, Rindfleisch and Heide [1997] called for the need to develop reliable and
valid measures of transaction costs.
2
A manufacturer who has invested in machinery or warehousing facilities to specifically cater to a supplier
places this investment at risk if the supplier chooses to forgo the customer—unless an enforceable contract
is in place.
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III. RELATIONALISM
While TCT has been used to explain interorganizational relationships, there is a growing cadre
of behavioral researchers that challenge the assumptions of economic models that overlook social
context factors like trust and dependence, exaggerate the influence of opportunism, and ignore the
importance of relationships [e.g., Barney 1990; Connor and Prahalad 1996; Saxton 1997]. However,
TCT has been used to examine behavioral governance structures from an economic perspective.
Williamson [1985] has briefly explored the concept of relationalism in the context of TCT. He
maintains that it reflects a focus on the exchange relation, which although falling short of vertical
integration, exhibits a significant level of cooperation between two partners.
Long-term cooperative relationships between firms that reflect mutual dependence between
partners have been called alliances [Monczka et al. 1998; Young-Ybarra and Weirsema 1999].
According to TCT, these relationships might still have the potential for opportunistic behavior.
However, economic tools such as the mutual (bilateral rather than unilateral) investment of specific
assets may be utilized to reduce the potential for opportunism by locking partners into a strategic
alliance with the expected long-term gain from maintaining the relationship exceeding the potential
short-term gains from opportunism and defection [Parkhe 1993]. Bilateral investment in a relationship
might, therefore, create a dependence on good faith, non-opportunistic behavior that can loosely be
referred to as cooperation [Heide and John 1990]. However, this cooperation is a result of formal,
self-enforcing safeguards, which are economic hostages created intentionally to control opportunism
by aligning the economic incentives of transactors [Dyer and Singh 1998; Williamson 1985]. If one
party invests more, then the safeguards do not offset, resulting in noncooperative, opportunistic
behavior on the part of one party.
It is our contention that the economic argument does not fully capture the concept of
relationalism. Relationalism extends TCT by considering intrinsic motivations of trust and a long-term
perspective. While TCT focuses on individual transactions, the concept of relationalism epitomizes
the entire relationship. In other words, the guard against opportunism is not due to economic
safeguards but due to each party’s appreciation of the past transactions in anticipation of future
exchange [Pilling, et al. 1994]. It has been argued that interorganizational cooperation (a behavior)
arises in the context of a specific relationship and unfolds through ongoing interaction corresponding
to a shift away from market exchange to bilateral governance [Bensaou 1997]. In other words,
relationalism reflects the idea of a relationship among parties based on a social component, largely
facilitated by trust or faith in others to work successfully. Therefore, relationalism departs from purely
economic motives and becomes overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of
cooperative behavior and abstention from opportunism [Ring and Van de Ven 1992; Zaheer and
Venkatraman 1995]. Similar concepts have been espoused in the literature under terms such as
social controls [Ghoshal and Moran 1996], relational exchanges [Joshi and Stump 1999], cooperation
[Heide and Miner 1992], network governance [Jones, et al. 1997], and informal self-enforcing
agreements [Dyer and Singh 1998]. The concept mirrors the notion of relational embeddedness,
which captures the degree to which exchange parties consider each other’s needs and goals
[Granovetter 1999; Powell 1990].
Therefore, relationalism can be interpreted as a governance mechanism that reflects implicit
open-ended relational contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and
safeguard exchanges. While hierarchies and markets reflect explicit contracts, relationalism is an
implicit contract, not legally binding, that has a reciprocal expectation. To the extent this expectation
is binding, it serves as a safeguard against opportunism in the relationship. It can further serve as
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a basis for value adding activities (partnerships, alliances) that go beyond governance. In this study,
we conceptualize relationalism based on the behavior of engaging in a dyadic relationship. This
involves dimensions of flexibility, shared problem solving, voluntary information exchange, and
restraint in the use of power by both parties [Heide and Miner 1992].
IV. TRANSACTION COSTS AND RELATIONALISM
Concern over opportunistic behavior is a primary motivator for firms to incur transaction costs.
Within the structure of a buyer-supplier dyad, the assessment of transaction costs by the buyer
reflects the supplier’s opportunistic propensity. This assessment by the buyer could subsequently
lead to behaviors that gauge and react to these costs. While classical TCT predicts hierarchical
relationships as an appropriate response to high transaction costs, this response is usually temporal.
Firms might act to mitigate transaction costs in the first period by setting up hierarchical relationships
in second period. However, concurrently there exists a level of relationalism within the dyad. While
transaction costs indicate economic controls and protections on the part of participants, relationalism
recognizes relationship preservation as the response to opportunism [Macneil 1980]. In dyads
characterized by high relationalism, anticipation of future exchange is viewed as a safeguard for
relationship-specific investments because it provides a restraint against opportunism [Heide and John
1990]. Further, self-regulation rather than economic or legal recourse indicates the collaborative
orientation required for relationalism [Frazier et al. 1988].
Some studies discuss relationalism in the context of TCT. For instance Jones, et al. [1997] argue
that a combination of specific conditions in the transactional environment could propel forms of
relationalism.3 The conditions could include customized exchanges high in human asset specificity
that require cooperation among exchange parties in order to transfer tacit knowledge. Similarly, tasks
that require specialized inputs create behavioral dependence that could heighten the need for
cooperative activities. Our primary concern, however, is the manifestation of transaction costs in the
dyad.
In general, the costly monitoring and control behaviors incurred in response to potential
opportunism are incongruent with the state of relationalism in the dyad. Therefore, we are concerned
with the incongruity at any instant between the perceived economic costs in the dyad due to potential
opportunism with the level of prevalent relational behavior. In similar vein, Parkhe [1993] found that
cooperation in alliances was negatively related to perceptions of opportunistic behavior on the part
of the partner. If high levels of monitoring and control characterize a dyadic relationship, then we
expect a lower level of relational behavior. Thus,
Hypothesis 1: Assessment of transaction costs in a dyad will be negatively related
to the extent of relationalism within that dyad.

3

Jones et al. [1997] use the term network governance to refer to joint relationships with social controls
between entities.
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V. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Proponents of the information processing view of organizational design have long maintained that
uncertainty in the environment gives rise to a need for information processing that should match with
capabilities in order to improve performance [Daft and Lengel 1986; Galbraith 1977]. Uncertainty in
the transactional environment can increase the potential for opportunism (e.g., due to information
asymmetry between the parties) and consequently increase the transaction costs incurred by the
parties involved. IT is one prominent mechanism that can be used to better manage these transaction costs by improving interorganizational information processing capabilities [Zaheer and
Venkatraman 1994]. Venkatraman [1991] proposes the concept of electronic integration to promote
collaboration between partners and reduce uncertainty in the transaction set. This integration could
involve automation of exchange procedures and documents and the sharing of applications and
databases.
IS researchers have mainly focused on the impact of IT in reducing coordination costs. This
includes the cost of exchanging information and incorporating that information into decision processes
as well as the cost incurred by the firm due to delays in the communication channel [Clemons et al.
1993]. Within the context of TCT, this is a major component of transaction costs. However, the other
major component, transaction risk, includes the risk of opportunistic behavior as well as the risk due
to information asymmetry among the parties. One party could shirk responsibilities due to the inability
of the other party to monitor. In addition, as indicated earlier, one party could take advantage of the
relation-specific investments of the other. In addition to coordination cost, IT can reduce transaction
risk by providing effective monitoring capabilities.
In sum, it is our contention that under conditions of high-perceived transaction costs, buyers may
seek bilateral investments in IT as mechanisms to manage these costs. These mechanisms could
include automation of the exchange processes, better visibility of the processes through information
tracking and sharing of databases and applications. We propose that such use of IT within the dyad
might be motivated by high transaction costs but will positively affect the level of relationalism. Four
arguments can be put forth to support this contention. First, as IT increases the information
processing capabilities of a relationship through faster and more accurate exchanges, it requires and
enables greater interfirm cooperation in order to make these investments more effective. The nature
of interorganizational IT sets the stage for bilateral initiatives in order for rational actors to gain from
their investments.4 Lack of cooperation on standards and processes can suboptimize benefits
obtained from the IT investments. Second, the greater the focus of IT on routine automation and
monitoring of exchange data, the more the ability of managers and other boundary spanners to waste
less time in regulating operational exchange and more in cooperative activities, many of which require
face to face interaction [Bensaou 1997]. Third, new IT enables new forms of electronic cooperation
using distributed CAD/CAM systems and other collaborative systems. These systems can lead to
relationalism when managers realize the value-added benefits (e.g., cross-company designs) of
cooperative behavior. Fourth, many of today’s open architectures (e.g. the Internet) may provide
cooperation capabilities without the cost and risk of ownership. And even if there is relation-specific
capital, cooperation may be required to recoup these investments on a long-term basis. In addition,

4
This could be reflective of an economic hostage situation where both parties have offsetting investments.
However, even though the relationship may be initially based on economic safeguards, we would argue that
it sets the stage for informal and social governance structures.
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there is some empirical evidence that supports the use of IT and the overall closeness of buyersupplier relationships [Stump and Sriram 1996].
Therefore, we expect that high-perceived transaction costs would lead to higher use of IT, which
in turn would lead to greater levels of relationalism. The duality of IT as both a control mechanism
as well as a relationship building mechanism is reflected in this thesis. This can be stated in the form
of the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The use of IT in the dyad will positively mediate the relationship
between perceived transaction costs and relationalism.
VI. METHODOLOGY
A survey instrument was used to test the hypotheses proposed. Survey instrumentation allows
for a rich assessment of the constructs and facilitates statistical testing of the relationships using a
large sample. The unit of analysis for this study was the buyer-supplier dyad. Since the interest was
in perceived transaction costs from the vantage point of the buyer, data were gathered from
organizational buyers. To limit industry affects, data were restricted to dyadic exchange relationships
of electrical equipment manufacturers (OEM) and their component suppliers. This industry reflects
a wide range of purchasing arrangements and provides a sampling frame of adequate size. Within
the set of buying organizations, the person most knowledgeable of supplier relationships would be
the most senior purchasing manager. Consistent with the guidelines of Huber and Power [1985],
these individuals were targeted.
An initial set of 1,000 purchasing managers was targeted.5 These individuals were asked to
identify a single supplier that satisfied four conditions:
•

The supplier provides an important input (electronic component) to the production process.

•

The company has a relationship (and not a one-time purchase) with this supplier.

•

All purchases from this supplier consist mainly of a particular type of component rather than
a wide variety of dissimilar components.

•

There is an electronic linkage between the company and this supplier (e.g., EDI, extranet,
intranet, Internet, etc.).

Respondents were then asked to fill out a carefully designed instrument specifically with respect to
the dyadic relationship involving the selected supplier (Supplier S) and component (Component C).
Of the 730 organizations that satisfied these criteria, 203 (27%) responded after two rounds of
solicitation. To ensure no response bias, difference tests (t-tests and Chi-squared analysis) were
conducted on sales volume, number of employees, product type, component type, and order
frequency between early and late respondents. No differences were significant (at the p < 0.01 level).

5

The initial list was obtained from a professional information service affiliated with a number of prestigious
IS magazines.
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MEASUREMENT OF CONSTRUCTS
Constructs were developed based on validated measures in the literature. Rich multidimensional
conceptualizations of all three major constructs were used. Transaction costs were measured based
on the Pilling et al. [1994] construct consisting of four dimensions: effort and cost required in
(1) developing the relationship, (2) monitoring the performance of Supplier S, (3) addressing problems
that might arise in the relationship with Supplier S, and (4) the likelihood of Supplier S taking advantage of the relationship. Each dimension was measured using multi-item scales adapted from Pilling
et al. Some scales were reversed to reduce method bias. Collectively, the dimensions reflect content
validity of the construct, incorporating elements of coordination costs and transaction risk discussed
earlier. The construct of relationalism was assessed based directly on concepts described and
measures validated by Heide and Miner [1992]. Four dimensions of relationalism were (1) flexibility
in the relationship, (2) voluntary exchange of useful information, (3) extent of shared problem solving,
and (4) restraint in the use of power. Respondents were given a series of statements and asked to
indicate their accuracy in describing the state of the relationship. It is important to note that these four
dimensions characterize the extent of commitment to cooperative behavior. Finally, IT use was
assessed by drawing from the broad concepts of automating, monitoring, and informating [Zuboff
1988] the activities involved in a customer life cycle [Ives and Learmonth 1984]. Automating refers
to IT-based automatic (versus manual) routinization of tasks, monitoring describes IT-based
surveillance and control, and informating refers to use of IT to generate access to relevant information
regarding productive and administrative processes. These three dimensions were operationalized
as (1) automation of these activities through IT, (2) monitoring of interactions through IT by having
better information flows, and (3) exchange and sharing of databases and files. Each dimension was
operationalized using multi-item scales adapted from Premkumar and Ramamurthy [1995] and
reflects the extent of use of IT within the context of the dyad. The complete set of items is provided
in Appendix A. Figure 1 describes the model being tested.
SAMPLE PROFILE
Tables 1 through 3 illustrate the profile of the sample used for data analysis. The majority of
respondents (66%) were responsible for the management of purchasing activities within the firm, as
reflected by their title. This included 11 percent in the top management cadre and 32 percent in other
management classes (IS, case, supplier-relationship, etc.) who would be in a position to respond to
the instrument. The components purchased were all electronic, with a large proportion of them being
classical components like integrated circuits, semiconductors, etc. Finally, as shown in Table 3, the
sample reflects a wide range of sizes, with about half the sample organizations having sales
exceeding $50 million.
VII. RESULTS
MEASUREMENT MODELS AND VALIDATION
Each individual first order construct was initially analyzed through item-to-total correlations. Items
with these correlations as well as commonalities less than 0.40 are dropped. The remaining items
are subject to confirmatory factor analysis [Lichtenstein et al. 19930. In Table 4, item-to-total correla-
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Effort

Coopflx

Monit

Coopinf

TC

REL

Prob

Coopshr

IT

Advantage

Cooprst
Auto

Moni

Exchg

Figure 1. Research Model
Table 1. Job Title
Value of
Variable
1
2
3

4
Missing

Actual Meaning

Percentage

Top Management Cadre (e.g., Director of Purchasing with significant
purchasing responsibility)
Top Management Cadre (same cadre and purchasing responsibility
as (1), but not directly related to purchasing)
Management Cadre (e.g., Purchase Manager, Procurement
Manager, with lesser purchasing responsibility; occurred most
frequently)
Other management

7.9
3.0
55.2

31.0
2.9

Investigating the Role of IT in Building Buyer-Supplier Relationships
by V. Grover, J. T. C. Teng, and K. D. Fiedler

Journal of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 3, 2002) 217-245

226

Table 2. Characterization of Component
Value of
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Missing

Actual Meaning

Percentage

Instruments, equipment.
Electrical goods (relays, transformers, etc.)
Mechanical devices (lifts, valves, etc.)
Electronic goods (e.g., ICs, electronic components, semiconductors,
etc.) occurring most frequently
Materials, metals, etc.
Chemicals, plastics, molded articles.
Related to computers, software, motherboards, peripherals, etc.
Others (e.g., education, medical services, etc.)

4.9
19.2
4.4
36.9
5.9
4.4
12.8
4.9
6.4

Table 3. Size of Responding Firms
Sales Volume (Million Dollars)
— 10
10 — 50
50 — 100
100 — 500
500 —
Missing

Percentage
20.2
29.6
8.9
10.3
18.2
12.8

tions and factor reliability are obtained from reliability analysis, and completely standardized loadings
of indicators on the first order construct are obtained from confirmatory factor analysis. The model
fit indices for each individual first order construct are presented in the column labeled “Statistics.”
Except for the dropped items, all item-to-total correlations and loadings are calculated from the
purified models. All remaining indicators have at least 50 percent of their variance in common with
the construct [Sharma 1996].
Convergent validity for each first order construct was evaluated by calculating the reliability for
each construct [Fornell and Larcker 1981, pp. 45-46]. For example, reliability for effort is .75 (the sum
of the item loadings2/[the sum of the item loadings2 + error loadings]). Based upon the numbers
shown in the final model in Figure 2, the reliability for effort is (.63+.49+.87+.86 )2/ ((.63+.49+.87+.86)2
+ (.77+.87+.50+.52)) ), which is greater than the recommended heuristic of 0.7 for strong convergent
validity [Jöreskog and Sörbom 1989; Kline 1998]. As shown in Table 5, all first order constructs have
good convergent validity.
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.77

Mang02

.87

Mang03

.50

Mang04

.52

Mang05

.85

Mang06

.70
.91
.48

Mang07
Mang08
Mang09

Measurement Model With Second
Order Factors

.63
.49
Effort

.87

.53
.71

.72

.42
.88

Coopinf

.85

Mang11
Mang12

.98

Prob

Mang13

Coopshr

.21

.15
.83

.79

Mang14

.49

Mang15

.65

Mang17

.70

Mang18

.58

Mang20

.62

.996

.95

.74
.82

.75

.81

Coop05

.65

Coop06

.75

Coop07

.78

Coop08

.65

Coop09

.77

Coop10

.67

Coop11

.83

Coop12

.58

Coop13

.64

Coop14

.40

.68

Advantage

.76

Coop04

.56

IT

.87
.62

.58

.64

.40
.92

Coop03

REL

.74
.53

.67
.76

.89

.87

.79

.82

.76

-.40

Monit

.82

.58

.70

TC
.61

Coopflx

Chi-Square=1701.94
DF=805
P-Value=.0001
TLI=.85
RNI=.86
RMSEA=.0746

.86

Coop01
.58

Cooprst

.76
.92

.71
.82

Auto

.82

.92

.94

.93

Moni

.90

.85

.92

Exchg

.96

.95

.92

.86

.91

.66

Auto1

Auto2

Auto3

Auto4

Auto5

Monit1

Monit2

Monit3

Monit4

Monit5

Exchg1

Exchg2

Exchg3

.57

.40

.33

.36

.44

.52

.39

.29

.31

.40

.50

.42

.75

Figure 2. Measurement Model with Second Order Factors

Investigating the Role of IT in Building Buyer-Supplier Relationships
by V. Grover, J. T. C. Teng, and K. D. Fiedler

Journal of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 3, 2002) 217-245

228

Table 4. Factor Analysis for Each Individual Construct

Second
Order
Construct

First
Order
Construct

Indicator
Variable*

Item-toTotal
Correlation

Completely
Standardized
Loadings of
Indicators on
the First Order
Construct

Statistics
2

Effort

Mang01
(dropped)
Mang02
Mang03
Mang04
Mang05

-.15
.56
.42
.74
.73

.17
.64
.47
.87
.85

P = 1.15 (p=.56), DF = 2
TLI=1.00, RNI=1.00, RMSEA =
.00
Factor Reliability =.79

Monitor

Mang06
Mang07
Mang08
Mang09
Mang10
(dropped)
Mang11

.55
.56
.42
.73
.31
.66

.53
.71
.41
.88
.26
.80

P2 = 39.33 (p=.0001), DF = 5
TLI=.81, RNI=.91, RMSEA = .19
Factor Reliability =.80

Problem

Mang12
Mang13
Mang14
Mang15

.51
.43
.55
.64

.46
.35
.77
.93

P2 = 38.31 (p=.0001), DF = 2
TLI=.55, RNI=.85, RMSEA = .30
Factor Reliability =.74

Advantage

Mang17
Mang18
Mang20

.63
.62
.70

.72
.71
.85

P2 = .00 (p=.0001), DF = 0
TLI=., RNI=1.00, RMSEA = .00
Factor Reliability =.80

Coopflex

Coop01
Coop02
(dropped)
Coop03
Coop04

.42
.295
.60
.47

.50
.36
.90
.58

P2 = .00 (p=.0001), DF = 0
TLI=., RNI=1.00, RMSEA = .00
Factor Reliability =.68

Coopinfor

Coop05
Coop06
Coop07
Coop08

.64
.56
.60
.64

.74
.64
.69
.76

P2 = 2.5238 (p=.0001), DF = 2
TLI=.993, RNI=.997, RMSEA
=.0362
Factor Reliability =80.

Coopshare Coop09
Coop10
Coop11
Coop12

.59
.68
.47
.64

.76
.83
.51
.72

P2 = 13.32 (p=.0001), DF = 2
TLI=.86, RNI=.95, RMSEA = .17
Factor Reliability =.79

.65
.57
.30

.98
.71
.32

P2 = .00 (p=. 0001), DF = 0
TLI=., RNI=1.00, RMSEA = .00
Factor Reliability =.68.

Transaction
Cost

Relationalism

Cooprst

Coop13
Coop14
Coop15
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Table 4. Factor Analysis for Each Individual Construct (Continued)

Second
Order
Construct

First
Order
Construct

Indicator
Variable*

Item-toTotal
Correlation

Completely
Standardized
Loadings of
Indicators on
the First Order
Construct

Statistics
2

Auto

Auto1
Auto2
Auto3
Auto4
Auto5

.81
.89
.92
.91
.87

.82
.92
.95
.93
.89

P = 18.04 (p=.0001), DF = 5
TLI=.98, RNI=.99, RMSEA = .11
Factor Reliability =.96

Monit

Monit1
Monit2
Monit3
Monit4
Monit5

.84
.90
.93
.92
.90

.85
.92
.96
.95
.92

P2 = 18.75 (p=.0001), DF =5
TLI=.98, RNI=.99, RMSEA = .12
Factor Reliability =.96

Exchange

Exchg1
Exchg2
Exchg3

.75
.79
.59

.85
.93
.63

P2 = 0 (p=.0001), DF = 0
TLI=., RNI=1.00, RMSEA = .00
Factor Reliability =.84

IT

*Some indicator variables (e.g., Mang16, Mang19) were dropped from the model based on purification criteria: items were
dropped if their item-to-total correlation and commonalities (square of completely standardized loadings) are both lower than
.40. The table shows item-to-total correlations and completely standardized loadings for items remaining in the model.
Subsequently item Coop 15 was dropped from the measurement model because of values less than 0.40 in the above table.

Discriminant validity analyses are conducted among all first order constructs that are under the
same second order construct6 [Fornell and Lacker 1981]. As shown in Table 5, 21 out of 30 average
extracted variances are greater than the corresponding shared variances between constructs,
indicating that discriminant validity is reasonable.

6

For example, transaction cost is a second order construct. It has four first order constructs: effort,
monitor, problem, and advantage. Suppose we are examining discriminant validity between effort and monitor.
1. First, calculate average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct: effort and monitor. AVE for
effort is .45 ( = (.632+.492+.872+.862)/((.632+.492+.872+.862) + (.77+.87+.50+.52)) ), and the AVE for
monitor is .40 [Fornell and Larcker 1981, p. 46].
2. Second, calculate the shared variance between these two first order constructs (effort and monitor),
which is .37 ( = (.70*.87)2 ). Please note, we use the second order factor model to derive the shared
variance between these two first order factors.
Third, compare the AVEs with the shared variance, if the AVEs for the constructs are greater than the shared
variance between the two first order constructs, then the discriminant validity between the two first order
constructs is satisfied. In this case, .45 and .40 are greater than .37, thus, we can conclude that the discriminant
validity between effort and monitor is satisfied.
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Table 5. Discriminant Validity Analysis

Contrast Between Construct 1
and Construct 2

Shared
Loadings of Loading of
Variance
Construct 1 Construct 2
AVE for
Between
on the
on the
AVE for
Construct 1 Construct Construct
Second
Second
1 $ Shared 2 $ Shared
and
Order
Order
Construct Construct 2 Variance† Variance+
Construct

Effort (Reliability = 0.75)
vs. Monitor
vs. Problem
vs. Advantage
Monitor (Reliability = 0.76)
vs. Problem
vs. Advantage
Problem (Reliability= 0.70)
vs. Advantage (Reliability = 0.73)
Coopflx (Reliability = 0.65)
vs. Coopinf
vs. Coopshr
vs. Cooprst
Coopinf (Reliability =0.74)
vs. Coopshr
vs. Cooprst
Coopshr (Reliability = 0.73)
vs. Cooprst (Reliability = 0.73)
Auto (Reliability = 0.91)
vs. Monit
vs. Exchange
Monit (Reliability =0.92)
vs. Exchange (Reliability = 0.78)

0.70
0.70
0.70

0.87
0.74
0.83

0.37
0.27
0.33

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

0.87
0.87

0.74
0.83

0.42
0.52

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

0.74

0.83

0.38

Yes

Yes

0.72
0.72
0.72

0.89
0.98
0.75

0.41
0.49
0.29

Yes
No
Yes

Yes
No
Yes

0.89
0.89

0.98
0.75

0.76
0.45

No
Yes

No
No

0.98

0.75

0.54

No

Yes

0.996
0.996

0.95
0.68

0.89
0.45

No
Yes

No
Yes

0.95

0.68

0.41

Yes

Yes

†

Yes indicates that the average variance extracted (AVE) is at least equal to the shared variance implying
discriminant validity

Since the objective was to capture the common variance among first order constructs in a higher
order latent measure for each of the three major concepts in the model, a second order model was
tested. A second order factor models the correlations among the first order constructs as a higher
order latent factor [Segars and Grover 1998]. Therefore, while the first order measurement model
simply models the six correlations among the four first order factors in each of relationalism and
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transaction cost, the second order model has four paths to the higher order construct as shown in
Figure 2. Comparisons are conducted between the second order factor measurement model and the
first order factor measurement model for both relationalism and transaction costs in Table 6. In both
cases, the second order factors model is not statistically different from first order model. Thus, based
on the parsimony principle (i.e., the second order models have four paths instead of six correlations),
it is superior to use the second order factor model.7 The results for the entire measurement model
(i.e., all constructs) is summarized in Table 5 for the first order model, and pictorially depicted in
Figure 2. Here again, the models demonstrate comparable fit (i.e., RMSEA is comparable),
indicating the appropriateness of accepting the higher-order factor model.
Table 6. Goodness of Fit Indices Comparison of Second Order Factor Model
with First Order Factor Model
Relationalism

Chi-Square
DF
p-Value
TLI
RNI
RMSEA

Transaction Cost

Second Order
Model

First Order
Model

Second Order
Model

First Order
Model

115.81
61
.0001
.93
.95
.07

114.88
59
.0001
.93
.95
.07

250.96
100
.0001
.87
.89
.09

244.31
98
.0001
.87
.90
.09

Table 7. Whole Measurement Model with Only First Order Factors
Goodness of Fit Index
Chi-Square
DF
p-Value
TLI
RNI
RMSEA

2666.25
1404
.0001
.84
.84
.07

7

Since there are only three first order factors for IT, this kind of comparison is not applicable because a
correlated three-factor model and a higher order factor model with three factors are mathematically equivalent.
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.77

Mang02

.87

Mang03

.50

Mang04

.52

Mang05

.85

Mang06

.70
.91
.48
.61
.85

Mang07
Mang08
Mang09

.63
Effort

.87
.86

.71

Mang13

.88

.87

.79

Mang14

.49

Mang15

.65

Mang17

.70

Mang18

.58

Mang20

-.42

.62
.76

.98

Prob
.29

.74
.82

.75
IT

.996

.95

Cooprst
Auto

.82

.82

.92

.94

.93

Moni

.90

.85

.92

Coop04

.81

Coop05

.65

Coop06

.75

Coop07

.78

Coop08

.65

Coop09

.77

Coop10

.67

Coop11

.83

Coop12

.58

Coop13

.64

Coop14

.40

.68

Advantage

.71

.58

.56

.83

.76

Coop03

.64
Coopshr

.11

.79

.67

REL

.74
.53

.82

.76

.89

TC

.87
.62

.72
Coopinf

.40
.92

Coopflx

Monit

.42

.82

.58

Chi-Square=1841.13
DF=845
P-Value=.0001
TLI=.84
RNI=.84
RMSEA=.0768

.70

.53

Coop01
.58

Structure Model With Second
Order Factors

.49

Mang11
Mang12
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.76
.92

Exchg

.96

.95

.92

.86

.91

.66

Auto1

Auto2

Auto3

Auto4

Auto5

Monit1

Monit2

Monit3

Monit4

Monit5

Exchg1

Exchg2

Exchg3

.57

.40

.33

.36

.44

.52

.39

.29

.31

.40

.50

.42

.75

Figure 3. Structure Model
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HYPOTHESES TESTING
Structural modeling permits simultaneous estimation of relationships within their network of
constructs and is a powerful method to examine direct and mediating effects. The results of the
structural model are depicted in Figure 3.8 In this model, only the causal paths were estimated. The
fit indices indicate a good fit, with the exception of the Chi-square index, which is sensitive to sample
size [Kline 1998]. However, a more accurate test is the Chi-square value/degrees of freedom that
is less than 3, indicating a good fit [Kline 1998].
The results indicate a strong negative relationship between perceived Transaction Costs and
Relationalism (-0.42; p < 0.01).9 This provides strong support for Hypothesis 1. The mediating role
of IT (Hypothesis 2) was also supported as indicated by a significant relationship between transaction
costs and IT use (0.11, p < 0.05), as well as between IT use and relationalism (0.29, p < 0.01). The
total indirect effect of IT on the relationship between IT and relationalism is, therefore, positive and
significant, as hypothesized.
The results clearly indicate that in conditions of high-perceived transaction costs there is low
relationalism within the buyer-supplier dyad. From a TCT perspective, this reflects the fact that high
opportunism perceived by buyers results in lower levels of relational governance. More importantly,
as hypothesized, the role of IT in the relationship (although not very strong) seems promising. If we
presume that high relationalism is a desirable condition, then it seems as if IT use in response to high
transaction costs leads to higher levels of relationalism. Alternatively stated, IT use plays a positive
role in reducing the negative impact of transaction costs on relationalism. While initial use might be
motivated by the need to reduce the effect of high transaction costs by investments in better automation, monitoring, and information exchange systems, the use of these systems within the bilateral
structure of the dyad leads to greater use of social and relational controls.
VIII.

COMPETITIVE VERSUS COOPERATIVE CYCLES

We can characterize the governance structure between buyers and suppliers in terms of
competitive and cooperative cycles. The competitive cycle, epitomized by TCT, uses economic arguments to frame the relationship. As suggested by this study, the state of transaction costs stems from
buyers’ perceptions of the supplier engaging in opportunistic behavior. The consequences of these
perceptions can be reflected in behaviors that seek to reduce opportunism. The economic perspectives espouse rational approaches to do this. Alternatively, the state of relationalism within the dyad
reflects aspects of social control. Its users seek to create normative integration by creating an
environment where the goals of the collective organizations are internalized [Ghoshal and Moran
1996]. Both the social state of the relationship (relationalism), as well as the rational state (transaction costs and opportunism) coexist within the dyad to different degrees and, as suggested by this
study, are in conflict (i.e., negatively correlated). While the cross sectional data analysis precludes

8
A two-step approach was followed for the structural model with fixed measurement model loadings in
model specification [Anderson and Gerbing 1988].
9
The significant result was robust across three equal subgroups of the sample divided based on high,
medium, and low transaction costs. The direct effect of perceived transaction costs on relationalism in each
case was negative and significant at p < 0.01.
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us from making strong causal claims, we would suggest that firms evolve in their relationships to
reduce this conflict. One exogenous variable that has been widely studied in this regard is trust [e.g.,
Zaheer, et al. 1998], which is argued to reduce perceived transaction costs and build relationalism.
Another, as we are discovering is investment in and use of IT.
IX. THE ROLE OF IT
There has been some research that suggests that in the U.S. automobile industry, IT promotes
competitive rather than cooperative behavior by automating transactions across industry-wide
platforms [Bensaou 1997]. Our results suggest that IT use within the OEM electronic industry does
facilitate relationalism.10
From a competitive perspective, the use of IT could be interpreted as a decision made in
response to high transaction costs. These could be in the form of IT use that facilitates control of
opportunistic tendencies: buyers use IT systems to automate transactions, thereby reducing the
uncertainty inherent in ordering, shipping, inventory control, and invoicing. Similarly, IT systems can
facilitate careful monitoring of transactions, reducing the ability of suppliers to engage in hidden
agendas invisible to the buyer. However, we also find that IT use in turn has a positive impact on
relationalism. This would suggest that in decisions to facilitate IT use through the (presumed)
agreements between the two parties, cooperative behavior manifests itself. Unfortunately, the results
provide little insight into the process through which rational and social controls emerge through IT.
We suspect, however, that the results might be different if there had been asymmetrical investments
in IT between the two parties.11 In cases where IT investments are asymmetrical, opportunistic
behavior rather than relationalism is reinforced, since one party can take advantage of the unique
commitment of the other. In cases where IT investment is balanced [Young-Ybarra and Wiersema
1999] or where IT ownership is irrelevant (i.e., the open Internet architectures prevalent today), firms
would do well to engage in IT use within the dyad. Nonspecific IT investments allow reduced
coordination costs without increased risk of ownership. Balanced investments in IT allow for reduced
opportunism and an increased ability to invest in relationalism. A consequence of this will be
consistent with the “move to the middle” hypothesis, where buyers forgo the advantages of markets
to focus on a few high quality relationships with suppliers [Clemons and Row 1992].
X. THE RELATIONALISM CAVEAT
This study presumes that relationalism is a positive attribute sought within every dyad. This is true
from two vantage points. First, partners can achieve an advantage by incurring lower transaction
costs. Second, such governance based on trust may allow partners to make investments in
relationship-specific investments, share proprietary knowledge, and engage in value-added activities.
Such initiatives may result in relational rents that competitors do not obtain due to their unwillingness
to engage in these initiatives because of the high costs of safeguarding them [Dyer and Singh 1998].

10
Interestingly, more recent development of business-to-business exchanges like Covisint between GM and
Ford is reflective of greater (potential) collaboration.
11

Any asymmetric investments were not assessed in our study.
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However, there are some caveats. Any long-term relationship can create significant levels of dependence (and vulnerability) for both partners. When partners have invested relational capital in each
other, they might be forced to pass on better exchange relationships in the future. Therefore, any
asymmetry in the performance of one partner (e.g., lags behind in technology) becomes inextricably
linked to the other. Even within the context of interorganizational systems, conflicts can arise [Kumar
and van Dissel 1996] and must be constantly managed for success. The most effective governance
structure will be contingent on the interplay of cooperative and competitive cycles pertaining to the
relational context in question.
XI. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Our study makes important theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature on the
governance structure in buyer-supplier relationships and the role of IT within that structure. However,
the validity of the implied causal links of the model is limited by the cross-sectional nature of the
research design. For instance, our results support the notion that perceived transaction costs give
rise to lower levels of relationalism. However, it is also conceivable that a reverse sequence of events
is operating and the existence of high relationalism ex ante creates a lower perception of transaction
costs. While our results are consistent with theoretical specification of events, alternative explanations of the results cannot be completely eliminated. We, therefore, encourage further investigation
of the findings based on in-depth case studies. Longitudinal studies can also enhance our understanding of the competitive and cooperative conflict within the relationship as it evolves, the
demarcation of reverse causality, the emergence of specific governance structures in response to
transaction costs, and factors that could lead to relational behaviors and value-added outcomes.
It could be also argued that even though complex multidimensional variables were examined in
the model, the model is oversimplified. A plethora of additional constructs have been studied as
antecedents to relationalism and could better contextualize the model. For instance, Saxton [1997]
studied the impact of reputation, length of the relationship, and partner similarity and their impact on
alliance outcomes. Jones et al. [1997] discuss environmental variables like task complexity, customization, human asset specificity, and frequency of exchanges as antecedent variables that would lead
to more social (network) governance. Also, trust [Zaheer et al. 1998] as an exogenous variable could
have a potential mitigating influence on both transaction costs and relationalism. With the number
of relationships expanding, this area provides fertile ground for developing a more refined network
of nomolological constructs to better understand the dyadic relationship.
This study also inferred the level of relationalism from the buyer side of the dyad. While we have
no reason to believe that this misrepresented the actual cooperative behavior (as measured), a more
robust study would examine both sides of the dyad. Additional information on the broader structure
of competitive markets (e.g., number and power of buyers and suppliers) could add rich insight into
the interpretation of dyadic governance structures.
We would also like to see further work on the types of IT involved in the relationship, rather than
just the manifestation of these technologies as assessed in our IT use variable. Better understanding
of the relationship-specific versus nonspecific (open) nature of the investment, particularly in today’s
e-commerce environment would shed light on the rationale behind the cooperative IT cycles. There
is evidence that suggests that IT can support a variety of governance modes (i.e., mixed modes of
hierarchies and markets) [Holland and Lockett 1997]. This study supports the role of IT in relational
governance. Interesting questions regarding the types of IT and their role in various governance
modes should also be examined.
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Finally, as indicated above, there are two sides to relationalism. We tend to focus on the positive
side, which was presumed throughout much of this manuscript. However, the negative implications
and tradeoffs involved in locking into a relationship as it pertains to performance are very critical to
developing prescriptive implications for this line of research.
XII. CONCLUSION
This study attempts to bridge the gap between predictions of TCT and the relationship orientation
observed in today’s buyer-supplier environment. In doing so, it attempts to frame the behavioral concept of relationalism within the TCT framework. It also represents one of the first studies in the IS
literature to capture, operationalize, and validate rich multidimensional constructs of perceived
transaction costs, relationalism, and IT use. Further, a large sample within the OEM electronics
industry was used to test the proposed hypotheses using structured equation modeling.
In general, both hypotheses were supported. What is particularly encouraging is that the use of
IT has a positive, albeit moderate, mediating effect on the negative relationship between transaction
costs and relationalism. This suggests that organizations might consider IT investment decisions
as an appropriate mechanism to facilitate cooperative behavior between companies. This is true
despite the fact that investments in IT might initially be made to alleviate opportunism.
The general framework of this study provides tremendous opportunities for researchers to further
explore the evolution of competitive and cooperative mechanisms implicit in the model. This line of
inquiry is critical in contemporary environments where (1) choice of governance structures and their
effectiveness is increasingly within the control of the dyadic players and (2) relationalism is becoming
more pervasive with increasing hypercompetition and knowledge-based exchanges between firms.
XIII.
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APPENDIX A: INSTRUMENTATION12
PERCEIVED TRANSACTION COSTS
This Section discusses issues on how you established and are maintaining your working relationship with Supplier S. We want to measure the amount of effort and costs that were required to set
up and maintain this relationship. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following
statements by circling the appropriate number:
In developing an association with Supplier S (with respect to Component C):
• It was understood in advance what this relationship would involve (Mang01)
• Significant effort was required to gather the information necessary to outline the working
relationship with Supplier S (Mang02)
• It was straightforward and easy to work out the main issues and necessary details of the
relationship with Supplier S (Mang03)
• There were many unspecified terms which had to be worked out as the relationship with Supplier
S developed (Mang04)
• It required significant effort to determine individual roles to be performed by our firm and Supplier
S (Mang05)
In Monitoring the performance of Supplier S:
• It is easy to tell if we were receiving fair treatment from Supplier S (Mang06)
• It takes significant effort to detect whether or not Supplier S conforms to specifications and quality
standards (Mang07)
• We are in a good position to evaluate how fairly our Supplier S deals with us (Mang08)
• Accurately evaluating Supplier S requires a lot of effort (Mang09)
• There is not much concern about Supplier S taking advantage of this Relationship (Mang10)
• It is costly, in time and effort, to clearly monitor the performance of Supplier S (Mang11)

12

Note that some of the items are reverse coded.
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In addressing problems that might arise in the relationship with Supplier S:
• The approach to solving problems in our relationship with Supplier S is clear-cut (Mang12)
• There are standard solutions or approaches to problems that might occur with Supplier S
(Mang13)
• Problem-solving is often challenging, due to the nature of Component C (Mang14)
• Although solutions to problems can be achieved, they would often need to be highly customized
(Mang15)
Concerning the likelihood of Supplier S taking advantage of its relationship with our firm:
• There are no incentives for Supplier S to pursue their interests at the expense of our interests
(Mang16)
• It is easy for Supplier S to alter the facts in order to get what they wanted (Mang17)
• There is a strong temptation for Supplier S to withhold or distort information for their benefit
(Mang18)
• It is difficult for Supplier S to promise to do things and get away without actually doing them later
(Mang19)
• There exists, from Supplier S’s perspective, a significant motivation to take advantage of
unspecified or unenforceable contract terms (Mang20)
RELATIONALISM
Please indicate the extent to which you believe that the following descriptions regarding your
relationship with Supplier S are completely accurate (1) or completely inaccurate (7) (Please circle
the appropriate number):
Flexibility:
• Flexibility in response to requests for changes is a characteristic of this relationship (Coop01)
• When some unexpected situation arises, the parties would rather work out a new deal than hold
each other to the original terms (Coop02)
• It is expected that the parties will be open to modifying their agreements if unexpected events
occur (Coop03)
• Changes in previously agreed prices are not ruled out by the parties, if considered necessary
(Coop04)
Information exchange:
• In this relationship, it is expected that any information that might help the other party will be
provided to them (Coop05)
• Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and informally and not only
according to a prespecified agreement (Coop06)
• It is expected that the parties will provide proprietary information if it can help the other party
(Coop07)
• It is expected that the parties keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect
the other party (Coop08)
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Shared problem solving:
• In most aspects of this relationship the parties are jointly responsible for getting things done
(Coop09)
• Problems that arise in the course of this relationship are treated by the parties as joint rather than
individual responsibilities (Coop10)
• The parties in this relationship do not mind owing each other favors (Coop11)
• The responsibility for making sure that the relationship works for both parties is shared jointly
(Coop12)
Restraint in the use of power:
• The parties feel it is important not to use any proprietary information to the other party’s
disadvantage (Coop13)
• A characteristic of this relationship is that neither party is expected to make demands that might
be damaging to the other (Coop14)
• The parties expect the more powerful party to restrain the use of its power in attempting to get
its way
• Time (Coop15)
IT USE
Automating the Interactions with IT
The following activities pertain to your firm’s interactions with Supplier S Please indicate the
extent to which these activities are carried out manually or executed automatically by the application
of information technology.
•
•
•
•
•

Exchanging information in components requirements, availability, price, etc (Auto1)
Ordering Components C (Auto2)
Shipping and receiving Components C (Auto3)
Inventory control (for Components C) (Auto4)
Invoicing and payment for Components C (Auto5)

Monitoring the Interactions with IT
Please indicate the extent to which information technology has helped in monitoring, tracking, and
discovering problems, etc. with respect to the following activities that pertain to your firm’s interactions
with Supplier S:
•
•
•
•
•

Exchanging information in components requirements, availability, price, etc (Monit1)
Ordering Components C (Monit2)
Shipping and receiving Components C (Monit3)
Inventory control (for Component C) (Monit4)
Invoicing and payment for Components C (Monit5)
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The following questions pertain to your electronic linkage with Supplier S
Please indicate the extent of your company’s computing interaction with Supplier S:
•
•
•

Our company shares databases with Supplier S (Exchg1)
Our company share application with Supplier S (Exchg2)
Our company exchanges files with Supplier S (Exchg3)
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